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The most striking commonality between the recent 
reviews of Léon Krier’s Albert Speer. Architecture 
1932 – 1942, (Monacelli Press, N.Y., 2013) is that they 
somehow managed to avoid the book’s central premises. 
These premises derive from three important lines of 
inquiry: 1) an examination of some of the justificatory 
claims of architectural modernism and its association 
with preferred political ideologies, 2) the uses and ab-
uses of architecture for political ends, and 3) the diffi-
cult realization that a good architect can also become 
a war criminal. Yet Krier’s lines of inquiry and con-
clusions are plainly evident in his text and especially 
in his comparative same-scale drawings of buildings 
realized by governments of widely divergent political 
ideologies during the first four decades of the twen-
tieth century. When the book was first published (by 
Les Archives d’architecture Moderne, Bruxelles, 1985) 
it provoked widespread condemnation because it con-
tradicted the method used by modernist architects and 
historians that consists in comparing a selection of 
classical buildings realized under the most oppress-
ive régimes of the past with a selection of modernist 
buildings realized under the most tolerant régimes of 
the present. Krier showed that justifying one preferred 
architecture by associating it with a preferred political 
régime, and condemning another architecture by as-
sociating it with a reviled political régime, contained 
several flaws, the most important of which was that 
the evaluators selectively deployed criteria when it 
was advantageous to their arguments and selectively 
withheld these same criteria also to further their own 
arguments. For if one were to use the same associat-
ive criteria with respect to some of the most extolled 
figures of modernism one cannot but conclude that 
they worked for or were prepared to work for condem-
nable political régimes (e.g. Giuseppe Terragni and 
Fascism in Italy, Mies van der Rohe, and Nazism in 
Germany, and Le Corbusier and the Vichy government 
in France). If an architectural character should be 
praised or condemned by its association with a polit-
ical ideology, then intellectually honest scholars are 
expected to consistently adopt this judgment in their 
work. The modernist embrace of Futurism is a case in 
point. On the one hand Modernism absorbed most of 
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Futurism’s artistic beliefs such as the vehement break 
with tradition; the rejection of the continuity of space 
and time in representation in favor of immediacy and 
dynamism; the radical belief in the redemption of 
science and technology; and the cult-like apotheosis 
of modernity. On the other, modernist architects 
and historians sought to separate the architecture of 
futurists from their exaltation of violence and their 
enthusiastic associations with the rise of Fascism in 
Italy by scarcely mentioning these extremes or simply 
remaining silent about them. To associate or dissoci-
ate political or artistic content depending on the most 
advantageous circumstances gravely compromises in-
tellectual integrity and the soundness of architectural 
judgment. Krier had the courage to oppose the domin-
ant modernist narrative on its own grounds. 
The Third Reich’s abuse of one of the traditions of 
classical architecture, one deriving from the nineteenth 
century academic tradition, was clearly inscribed 
within a larger program that manipulated all cultural 
forms, all the visual and rhetorical arts and their sym-
bolism. Its aim was to convince as many unsuspect-
ing minds as possible that the collection of images (as 
masks) with which the Reich surrounded itself was a 
direct representation of its political ideology. The de-
ceptive syllogism was: the more attractive the mask, the 
more appropriate the ideology! In truth, however, all 
the cultural forms used by the Reich emerged within 
different and earlier contexts having no relationship to 
the Reich. This intervention effected a very deep schism 
between form and content, because if any form can be 
dissociated from its originating context and attached to 
any content, then signifier and signified have collapsed, 
and the symbolic nature of art or architecture has been 
rendered dysfunctional. A balcony in Palazzo Venezia 
does not make for a fascist state, nor does an oval office 
in the White House make for a democratic state. 
Architects and historians have also extended 
their spurious political associations to materials, as if 
masonry, wood, iron, steel, or glass, somehow carry 
political meaning. For decades, going as far back as W. 
Gropius’ Werkbund building of 1914, many architects 
have insisted on an absurd association: glass, steel, and 
aluminum are, par excellence, the materials of modern-
ity, of open government and democracy. Take for ex-
ample the former Reichstag, now Bundestag, in Berlin 
whose “renovation” was completed in 1999. The build-
ing’s interior – which had survived in a very damaged 
state following the bombardment of WWII – was al-
most completely eviscerated with the exception of the 
outer walls and a small intervention made in the 1960s. 
The most visible external part of this “renovation” was 
a new steel and glass cupola containing an inverted 
conical structure covered with mirrors. This cupola 
was recently hailed as a symbol of the transparency of 
a democratic government. Yet the original cupola that 
was begun under the reign of Wilhelm I and completed 
in 1894 under Wilhelm II was also made of iron and 
glass. In the span of one hundred years, two mostly 
glass cupolas, admittedly with different articulations, 
represented empire and then democracy!
Inherent within Krier’s critique are implications 
that go far beyond the architecture built under the 
Third Reich. His critique touches on an essential part of 
architecture, namely, how is architectural character en-
dowed with content and where is the ascribed content 
appropriate or spurious? Architectural character has 
the capacity to elicit complex associative thoughts and 
emotions on the part of the observer that go beyond 
the initial intentions of the architect and the patron. Of 
these associations and projections, the political vesture 
has played a significant role in both the understanding 
as well as the misunderstanding of architectural char-
acter. When politics provides the legislative framework 
for a civic association, it articulates a common ethos. 
When architecture provides the physical framework 
that shelters the public and private realms, endowing 
each of them with its own suitable character, it artic-
ulates a common locus. Understandably, politics and 
architecture have been linked. After all, both of these 
arts are called to serve the city. But it is one thing to 
state that architecture serves, shelters, and endows with 
suitable character the various political purposes within 
the city, be they governmental, mercantile, or cultural, 
and quite another to claim that architectural qualities 
represent political content. The second claim implies 
that one can pass from judging architectural qualit-
ies to the judging of political intentions or vice versa. 
More explicitly, it suggests that there is an association 
between the composition of architectural elements and 
a political content that hovers over the minds of archi-
tects and guides their hands.
Now architectural character and political content 
can certainly be used, misused, and abused. There have 
been many contentions about their relationship with 
some architects and historians seeing no relationship 
whatsoever, and other architects and historians consid-
ering architecture as a direct representation of polit-
ical aims. Much ink and saliva have been spilled on 
this issue that sharply divided architectural debates in 
the nineteen seventies and eighties, and it still does. In 
these decades, the debate concentrated primarily on the 
associations between politics and architectural charac-
ter (calling it style), and on historians’ use of ideological 
factors in order to privilege one dominant narrative, 
one preferred set of architectural forms. This debate, 
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however, neglected several significant points that are 
germane to the link between politics and architecture. 
It did not justify why the citizen politician and the cit-
izen architect are both called to build the city. It did 
not explain the difference between political freedom of 
expression and architectural or artistic freedom of ex-
pression; nor did it clarify that the confusion of artistic 
genres is related to the confusion regarding the differ-
ent kinds of artistic freedom. The clash about these 
issues seems to have recently receded into the back-
ground of architectural exchanges perhaps because far 
from having resolved this issue the protagonists have 
temporarily put aside an exhausting argument fraught 
with intense rancor.
It is important to note that Speer himself, as attested 
by his Memoirs, clearly intended to use his architecture 
as an expression of the political ideology of the Reich. 
And yet, in his Preface to Albert Speer Architecture, 
Speer expresses ambivalent if not contradictory opin-
ions about the political role of his architecture. On the 
one hand, he declares that “…my buildings were not 
solely intended to express the essence of the National-
Socialist movement. They were an integral part of that 
very movement.” On the other, he asserts: “I am not 
sure that I agree with those critics who assign an ideolo-
gical content to my architecture… In reality, the means 
that we used were not founded on ideology but were 
justified politically – they resulted from the political 
struggle for power.” If his architecture was meant to 
express the “essence of the National-Socialist move-
ment”, then this essence must stand for the content of 
this architecture, at least in his eyes. But then Speer 
shifts his discussion from essence to means and he af-
firms that these means served politics and power. It is 
important to note then that Krier’s critique applies also 
to Speer’ abuse of classical architecture for the political 
ends of the régime that he served. Krier’s detractors 
usually ignore this aspect of his critique. Krier’s de-
tractors also remain silent about his piercingly candid 
question: what about the other buildings of the Reich 
which were industrial in their overwhelming major-
ity? Why does the architecture of industry (especially 
that of armaments) not fall under the same associative 
scrutiny?
Krier’s detractors do not forgive him for having 
understood that Speer was a good architect before he 
became a Nazi – before he served Hitler’s megaloma-
niacal intentions. 
Speer’s ethical failure resided in putting his ar-
chitectural as well as his organizational talents in 
the service of the Nazis who also used the mul-
tiple talents of sculptors (Arno Breker), film makers 
(Leni Riefsenthal), and especially scientists (Werner 
von Braun) and industrialists for their sinister ends. 
That Speer was a war criminal is self-evident. But Krier 
calls attention to one of the great paradoxes of the hu-
man character: the same individual is capable of being 
at once an artist and a criminal. The knowledge that art 
historians, writers, and film-makers have of the violent 
actions of Caravaggio – which he handled with san-
guine dexterity– somehow does not deter them from 
appreciating his paintings. Krier does not suggest that 
Speer’s architecture should become part of the réper-
toire of precedents that architects study. Nor does he 
suggest that in order to study Speer one should separate 
ethical beliefs and architectural practice. Rather Krier 
draws attention to the spurious associations between 
artistic forms, architectural forms and a host of mean-
ings that are external to architecture, such as political 
content. Since the governments of Washington, New 
Delhi, Berlin, and Moscow concomitantly used sim-
ilar forms of classical architecture to represent their 
different political ends, how could one but conclude 
that the different political meanings assigned to this 
architecture are a proof of her political innocence? 
